



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 3

What Suez Means to Israel

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by Don Peretz

Although Israel has not yet been directly involved in the present Suez Canal conflict between the Western powers and Egypt, its eight-year dispute with the Egyptians about the right of free transit through the waterway casts a long shadow over the negotiations now going on in London, Washington and Cairo.

Israeli complaints about Egypt's blockade of the canal were brought before the United Nations Security Council on three different occasions since the Arab-Israel conflict erupted in 1948. Israel first presented the matter to the Council in July 1951. The complaint was that Egyptian practices of "visit and search" against vessels suspected of carrying "contraband goods" to Israel were inconsistent with the Israeli-Egyptian 1949 armistice agreement; that they violated the Constantinople convention of 1888 guaranteeing free transit through the canal to all nations in peace and war; that they undermined general principles of international law which protect the rights of all nations to navigate freely upon and between the high seas; and that they violated the United Nations Charter.

Egypt maintained that no blockade existed, but that as an active belligerent it was en-

titled to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for legitimate self-defense. This argument was rejected by the Security Council in its resolution of September 1, 1951. The Council declared Egypt's interference "inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the armistice agreement." It called upon Egypt "to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping . . . and to cease all interference with such shipping . . ."

In 1954 Egypt began to permit non-Israeli ships carrying nonstrategic goods consigned to and from Israel to pass through the canal. But it continued the blockade of Israeli ships, still insisting that article 10 of the 1888 Convention permits Egypt to ban enemy commerce for reasons of self-defense.

Israel again raised the question before the Council in February 1954. A New Zealand draft resolution, noting with grave concern Egypt's lack of compliance with the 1951 resolution, was defeated in March by a Soviet veto although it was supported by eight of the eleven Council members.

The third instance was Israel's complaint

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in September 1954 about Egyptian seizure of the freighter *Bat Galim*, the only Israeli vessel which attempted to pass through the canal. The *Bat Galim* was en route to Haifa from Eritrea with a cargo of food and hides. Egypt charged that the ship was held, its cargo confiscated and the crew imprisoned because it had fired on Egyptian fishermen. Again discussion was renewed in the Council, but on January 1, 1955 the *Bat Galim* crew was set free, and Cairo offered to release the vessel and its cargo to any neutral nation which would take it out of Egyptian hands. Subsequently Britain, France and the United States commended Egypt for its conciliatory attitude while supporting Israel's demand that its ships be allowed to pass through the canal. No new resolution was passed and the Security Council debate ended on January 13, 1955. Finally Cairo put the *Bat Galim* up for auction because Israel refused to designate any but an Israeli crew to take it out of Egyptian hands.

Since the *Bat Galim* case, no other Israeli ships have tried to go through the canal. All indications are that the Nasser government would block such an attempt, and Cairo continues its practice of visit and search for contraband aboard Israel-bound ships.

Prime Minister David Ben Gurion of Israel raised the matter once again in his parleys with Dag Hammarskjöld last spring when the UN secretary general attempted to check the rapidly mounting tension along the Arab-Israel frontiers. Israel felt that Mr. Hammarskjöld should do some-

thing about Egyptian interference with its shipping since the Security Council had declared the Egyptian practices to be a violation of the armistice agreement. There were rumors that Mr. Ben Gurion offered to withdraw his troops from the El Auja demilitarized zone along the Egyptian frontier in exchange for free transit through the canal.

The secretary general, however, pointed out that the Council had specifically requested him to be "primarily" concerned with the situation along the armistice borders. In his reply to the Israeli prime minister's request for action on the canal, Mr. Hammarskjöld wrote, "If a question were to be considered as outside my formal mandate, the extent to which a discussion of it is appropriate or possible will be determined by the willingness of the governments concerned to consider it with me in my capacity as secretary general."

Reaction in Israel

For the first six weeks after President Nasser nationalized the canal on July 26, Israel tended to understate its position rather than take a lead in the outcry against Egypt. Even Radio Cairo commented favorably on Israel's role. When Israel was omitted from the list of nations invited to the London conference of August 16-23, it made only relatively mild protests to the powers concerned. It was not until September 6 that Israel broke its diplomatic silence with a new criticism of Egyptian blockade policies. Then Dr. Abba S. Eban, Israeli ambassador to

Washington, charged that Egypt's failure to permit the Greek freighter *Pannegia* to deliver a load of cement to Elath demonstrated "in most brazen fashion" President Nasser's disregard of the 1951 Security Council resolution and Egypt's obligations under the 1888 Constantinople Convention.

Until the Western Big Three proposal for a canal "users' association" was made September 12, the Israeli government and press tended to be critical of the "easy" way in which Nasser was being let off the hook. But British Prime Minister Eden's release of the new plan was widely acclaimed in Israel. The Israeli Foreign Ministry said the plan could make "a significant contribution to the pacification of the area." Even the extreme nationalist Herut party, which never ceases its cry for forceful action against Egypt, seemed pleased with the new move. Menachem Begin, fiery leader of Herut, went so far as to call for alliances with France and Britain against Egypt.

Reaction in Israel to Eden's speech was so enthusiastic that a spate of rumors began to circulate about the possibilities of British military assistance, or even Western bases in Israel. In London, Sir Anthony Eden predicted that President Nasser would attack Israel if he got away with seizure of the canal. He hinted that in such an event Britain might send arms to Israel—although as recently as July 2 British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had said that the balance of military strength was "rather

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The Future of U.S. Defense

There is no better subject for fast and furious debate here than the adequacy of America's defense—or to put it differently, its military policy. The first reason of course is that this is an election year, and with a subject on which the nation's security depends there is no better issue to view with alarm or justify with pride. The second reason, and the one that makes it possible for such contradictory assertions as the Democrats and Republicans are making on the subject, is that the issue itself is so surrounded by imponderables as to be impossible of a scientific analysis.

Matter of Judgment

The only thing the Democrats and Republicans can agree on is that defense must be adequate; that we must be able to retaliate instantly and effectively against any aggressor; that such military strength must be maintained as long as world conditions require it. But from that point on the political parties part company. The Republicans say we have all this, that our strength and security have never been greater; the Democrats say we do not have it; that we have a second-best defense force, that the Army has been starved and that our capacity to deal with threats is thereby weakened. The voters are urged to return to office the Republicans, who promise that they will continue to maintain and strengthen our military might, our security and our prestige. The Democrats cry for voter support with the same appeal but exactly opposite interpretations of the current situation. It is all a little confusing until you relate it to the November election.

But the fact of an election does not alter the other fact that what is adequate defense is in the end a matter of judgment. There is no mathematical formula, however involved, that can produce undisputed answers to such controversial questions as the following: what the size of the armed forces should be; the size of each service and the proper role and mission of each; the impact of new weapons on strategy and tactics; the strength and intentions of the enemy. And when you get down to the myriad subquestions to these questions the answers become almost pure judgment and guesswork. And yet these are issues that must be considered, debated, resolved and answered. For there is a new budget coming up; there are allocations of the defense dollar that must be made; there are decisions on the various roles of the respective forces that cannot be avoided; there are questions of strategic concept that have to be answered in planning military forces, weapons, deployment of strength, and so on.

While it would be hard to anticipate just what the Democrats would do differently from the Republicans should they win this year's election, it is possible to recognize the trend of events and at least the probabilities. The Republicans seem determined to provide adequate defense and also present a balanced budget; and it can be expected that the one will be presented in terms of the other. They have already hinted that future defense might cost a bit more than it did this year—which would bring its cost up to about \$35,000,000,000 a year. The Air Force is still the favored service and will get the

larger bite of the defense dollar whichever party wins in November. But the Democrats who in the last Congress forced an extra billion dollars on the Administration for more air strength would be expected to favor the Air Force even more than Republicans. They would also, it is assumed, be less interested in squeezing it all into a balanced budget.

Controversy Over Draft

The parties have gotten into a political hassle over the matter of the draft—with Adlai E. Stevenson suggesting it might be dropped if things are going as well as the Republicans say they are, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower saying there is no chance in the world of such action in the foreseeable future. Both parties insist they will ride the revolution in weapons that is sweeping the world—jet planes, nuclear weapons, missiles; but the Republicans say they are doing it, while the Democrats deplore their opponents' failure to do so. They both insist they are going to go all out for scientific and technological training of American youth—to keep up with the discoveries that are revolutionizing warfare; but the Republicans are a little defensive in their statements, possibly because of the original disinterest of Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson in research and development.

But whichever party wins it looks as if the Army is going to be the loser in the interservice battle for the largest bite in the defense dollar. It has been steadily losing for some time; and everything points to more and more reliance on improved weapons and air power rather than man-

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What Should U.S. Do About Defense?

Republican platform, San Francisco, California, August 21, 1956, as reported in The New York Times, August 22, 1956:

The military strength of the United States has been a key factor in the preservation of world peace during the past four years. We are determined to maintain that strength so long as our security and the peace of the world require it.

This Administration, within six months after President Eisenhower's inauguration, ended the war in Korea by concluding an honorable armistice. The lesson of that war and our lack of preparedness which brought it about will not be forgotten. Such mistakes must not be repeated.

As we maintain and strengthen the security of this nation, we shall, consistent with this Administration's dedication to peace, strive for the acceptance of realistic proposals for disarmament and the humanitarian control of weapons of mass destruction.

Our country's defense posture is today a visible and powerful deterrent against attack by an enemy, from any quarter, at any time.

Necessary Deterrents

We have the strongest striking force in the world—in the air—on the sea—and a magnificent supporting land force in our Army and Marine Corps. Such visible and powerful deterrents must continue to include:

(a) A jet-powered, long-range, strategic air force, and a tactical air force of the fastest and very latest type aircraft, with a striking capability superior to any other;

(b) The most effective guided and ballistic missiles;

(c) A modern Navy with a powerful naval aircraft arm prepared to keep the sea lanes open to meet any assignment;

(d) An Army whose mobility and unit fire power are without equal;

(e) Bases, strategically dispersed at home and around the world, essential to all these operations.

We will maintain and improve the effective strength and state of readiness of all these armed forces.

To achieve this objective, we must depend upon attracting to, and retaining in, our military services vigorous and well-trained manpower, and upon continuously maintaining in reserve an enthusiastic and well-informed group of men and women.

This will require incentives that will make armed service careers attractive and rewarding. A substantial start has been made toward bolstering the rewards and benefits that accompany a military career. We must continue to provide them.

In order that American youth in our armed services shall be provided with the most modern weapons, we have supported, and will continue to support, an effective and well-directed program of research and development, staffed by men of the highest caliber and ability in this field. There is no substitute for the best where the lives of our men and the defense of our nation are concerned.

We fully appreciate the importance of scientific knowledge and its application particularly in the military field.

This is the last of four *Forums* published before the November Presidential elections, in which the views of Republican and Democratic spokesmen on major foreign policy problems are presented. Each *Forum* has been accompanied by an article analyzing the given problem—in this instance Neal Stanford's article, "The Future of U.S. Defense."

WHAT REPUBLICANS THINK

We pledge ourselves to stimulate and encourage the education of our young people in the sciences with a determination to maintain our technological leadership.

In this age of weapons of inconceivable destructiveness, we must not neglect the protection of the civilian population by all known means, while at the same time preparing our armed forces for every eventuality. . . .

We agree and assert that civilian authority and control over our defense structure and program must be maintained at all times. We believe, without qualification, that in our present Commander-in-chief, Dwight D. Eisenhower, this nation possesses a leader equipped by training, temperament, and experience in war and in peace, for both that personal example and that direction of our national defense in which the American people will continue to have confidence, and in which the peoples of all the free world will find an increasing sense of security and of an opportunity for peace.

...President Eisenhower's address to the nation from Washington on September 19, 1956, as recorded by The New York Times:

We cannot prove wise and strong by any such simple device as suspending, unilaterally, our H-bomb tests. Our atomic knowledge and power have forged the saving shield of freedom. And the future use and control of atomic power can be assured, not by any theatrical national gesture, but only by explicit and supervised international agreements.

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WHAT DEMOCRATS THINK

Democratic platform, Chicago, Illinois, August 16, 1956, as reported in The New York Times, August 16, 1956:

The Republicans have slashed our own armed strength and have weakened our capacity to deal with military threats of any sort, stifled our Air Force, starved our Army and weakened our capacity to deal with military threats of any sort save by retreat or by the alternative, "massive retaliation" and global atomic war. Yet, while our troubles mount, they tell us our prestige was never higher, they tell us we were never more secure.

The Democratic party believes that waging peace is a monumental task to be performed honestly, forthrightly, with dedication and consistent effort. We are convinced that the Republican Administration has proved conclusively its lack of these essential qualities.

The way to lasting peace is to forego bluster and bluff, to regain steadiness of purpose, to join again in faithful concert with the community of free nations; to look realistically at the challenging circumstances which confront us; to face them candidly and imaginatively, and return to the democratic policy of peace through strength.

This is a task for Democrats. This facing of new problems, rising to new challenges, has been our party's mission and its glory for three generations past. President Truman met and mastered Stalin's challenge a decade ago, with boldness, courage and imagination, and so will we turn to the challenge before us now, press-

ing the search for real and lasting peace. . . .

Adequate Defense Needed

In this atomic age, war threatens the very survival of civilization. To eliminate the danger of atomic war, a universal, effective and enforced disarmament system must be the goal of responsible men and women everywhere. So long as we lack enforceable international control of weapons, we must maintain armed strength to deter war. But technological advances in the field of nuclear weapons make disarmament an urgent problem. Time and distance can never again protect any nation of the world. The Eisenhower Administration, despite its highly publicized proposals for aerial inspection, has made no progress toward this great objective. We pledge the Democratic party to pursue vigorously this great goal of enforced disarmament in full awareness that irreparable injury, even total destruction, now threatens the human race.

We reject the false Republican notion that this country can afford only a second-best defense. We stand for strong defense forces so clearly superior in modern weapons to those of any possible enemy that our armed strength will make an attack upon the free world unthinkable and thus be a major force for world peace. The Republican administration of our armed forces stands indicted for failing to recognize the necessity of proper living standards for the men and women of our armed forces and their families.

We pledge ourselves to the better-

ment of the living conditions of the members of our armed services and a needed increase in the so-called "fringe benefits."

Training for Defense

The Democratic party pledges itself to a bold and imaginative program devised to fully utilize the brain power of America's youth as a guarantee of unquestioned supremacy in the scientific and technical fields.

Scholarships and loan assistance and such other steps as determined desirable must be employed to secure these objectives. This is in the interest of necessary and adequate national defense. . . .

We inaugurated and we strongly favor collective defense arrangements such as NATO and the Organization of American States within the framework of the United Nations. We realize, as the Republicans have not, that mutually recognized common interests can be flexibly adapted to the varied needs and aspirations of all countries concerned.

Adlai E. Stevenson at his news conference, Washington, D.C., September 17, 1956, as reported in The New York Times, September 18, 1956:

I shall probably have more to say on this intricate subject later. Today let me just remind you what I did say in Los Angeles on the fifth of September, and I quote here an excerpt from that speech:

"It is clear that we must rethink the problems of military strategy and military requirements in this atomic age. Many military thinkers believe that the armies of the future, a future now upon us, will employ mobile, technically trained and highly professional units equipped with tactical atomic weapons. Already it has become apparent that our most urgent need is to encourage trained

men to re-enlist rather than to multiply the number of partly trained men, as we are currently doing.

"We can now anticipate the possibility hopefully but responsibly that within the foreseeable future we can maintain the military forces we need without the draft. I think it is the national will, shared equally by every American candidate or voter, Democrat or Republican, that the draft be ended at the earliest possible moment, consistent with the national safety."

Now I have read the comments of President Eisenhower and of Vice President Nixon, but I, for one, am not content to accept the idea that there can never be an end to compulsory military service.

My statement does not call for the immediate termination of the draft. It does not call for a reduction in the strength of our armed forces or in our ability to deal with any defensive contingency or in our determination to discharge our commitments under NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or other pacts. What it does call for is re-examination of our military policy in the light of the recent extraordinary changes in military technology.

Nothing is more hazardous in military policy than rigid adherence to obsolete ideas. We need fresh thought about the structure of American defense as urgently as we need fresh thought about the great issues of foreign and domestic policy.

It should be obvious that the weapons revolution which has transformed the character of warfare has also altered the training needs and personnel requirements. . . .

In short, some men are already going into the service as a career. In time, we may be able to meet our manpower requirements on a voluntary basis if we further strengthen the incentives for enlistment so that

men can be assured a career in the armed forces with a decent provision for family life and for retirement. . . .

Republicans

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We cannot prove wise and strong by hinting that our military draft might soon be suspended, even though every family naturally hopes for the day when it might be possible. This I state categorically cannot be done under world conditions of today. It would weaken our armed forces; it would propagate neutralist sentiments everywhere. It would shock our allies, who are calling upon their people to shoulder arms in our common cause.

We cannot, in short, face the future simply by walking into the past backwards.

We cannot salute the future with bold words while we surrender it with feeble deeds. . . .

Newsletter

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power as the basis of United States defense. The reduction in ground troops, however, does serve to steadily increase the nation's reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare as the answer to aggression. It may make the United States a more compact powerful fighting force, but it does appear to limit its operations as a bucket brigade putting out brush fires around the world. Atomic weapons are hardly the proper instruments for fire brigades and border police. The obvious need to keep abreast of modern weapons development, plus the greatly increased cost of such weapons is almost automatically driving Washington into a program emphasizing weapons over manpower. Added to this is the fact that the training required for these modern weapons goes way beyond anything required in previous wars.

Thus today the military and civilian leaders have to make some very basic, profound and risky decisions; there is no reason to believe they are not making them on their best judgment. But it would be quite possible for a different set of officials, equally dedicated to the nation's defense and security, to arrive at some widely different decisions. For, as pointed out in the beginning of this article, we are here dealing with matters of judgment.

NEAL STANFORD

Peretz

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er in favor of Israel" when compared with its Arab neighbors. However, Her Majesty's Government became concerned about possible misinterpretation of their position, and issued a statement on September 11 to the effect that establishment of British bases in Israel was not contemplated in the near future.

Nasser's nationalization move has revived talk of proposals for an alternative canal across Israel's Negev semi-desert. The shortest route is 190 miles, as compared with 103 of the Suez Canal. Although there is no authoritative estimate of the cost, officials believe that it might run to \$3 billion. For the time being this seems to be a far more expensive alternative to Suez than the re-routing of ships around the Cape of Good Hope.

In view of the hornets' nest of troubles which could be stirred up by playing off Israel against Egypt, it is not likely that the Western powers will alienate the rest of the Arab world and possibly large parts of Asia by using Israel as a bridgehead for action against Nasser.

Dr. Peretz is research director of Regional Research Analysts, an organization for area studies in economic, political and social affairs. In 1947-48 he covered the Arab-Israel conflict as a radio and newspaper correspondent, and from 1952 to 1954 he studied tensions in the area with the aid of a Ford Foundation grant.



U.S., U.S.S.R. and Suez

If the distinguished historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, is right in contending that those civilizations have perished in the past which, when challenged, either failed to respond or else made a response that was inadequate, then it may well prove that the Western powers now face at Suez a challenge which could prove the start of their undoing unless they can alter the character of their response. As the second Suez conference summoned by the West in London since Egypt's nationalization of the canal ended on September 21, the sum total of responses made by Britain, France and the United States either separately or together appeared to have weakened the position of the West and strengthened that of the U.S.S.R., which had emerged as the self-appointed champion of Egypt.

Only a year before, in September 1955, the West had been shocked by the decision of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, then premier, now president, of Egypt to purchase arms from the Soviet bloc in return for long-term exports of Egypt's principal product, cotton, after Cairo had tried in vain to obtain arms from the United States, which was willing to sell only for dollars the Egyptians lacked. This move, which apparently caught Western diplomats by surprise, brought the U.S.S.R. to a strategic position at Suez, and thus at the entrance to the Mediterranean, which the Tsarist Empire had unsuccessfully sought to achieve in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Moscow's new position, moreover, was won without the firing of a shot.

Confronted by Russia's claim to a voice in the Middle East, the United States and Britain sought to check-

mate Soviet economic competition by offering to help Egypt build the High Aswan Dam with the aid of the World Bank, only to withdraw this offer in July 1956 when they reached the conclusion that the U.S.S.R., contrary to Cairo's expectations, was not interested in financing this project. This decision not only precipitated Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, but left Moscow in the role of the innocent bystander while the Western powers were accused by the Egyptians of undermining their country's economy and blocking its industrialization. Even if Washington and London believed by that time that financing of the dam was genuinely undesirable, Western diplomacy might have avoided this head-on collision with Egypt by either prolonging the negotiations or proposing further technical studies of the project. At the very least, they could have spared Nasser the humiliation of a brusque public rejection accompanied by derogatory comments about his country's economic situation, which even a less fervent nationalist leader would have resented.

What West Might Have Done

Once Nasser had nationalized the canal company, the West could have chosen a number of ways to negotiate with Egypt about guarantees of free navigation through Suez. Without denouncing Nasser personally or revealing a desire to see him overthrown, and without mobilizing their armed forces, Britain and France could have called for orderly review of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which was signed at a time when modern Egypt was still a

part of the Ottoman Empire and not the independent nation it has become since the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone, completed only this year. Disturbing as Nasser's unilateral actions have been to the West, as of September 18 he had not violated international law and had carried out his July 26 pledge of maintaining free navigation through the canal for the ships of all nations—with the continued exception of Israel, an exception the Western nations had not previously challenged by force.

Alternatively, the Western nations could have invited UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to study the possibility of reconciling the conflict of interests at Suez through discussions, perhaps of a private character, at the United Nations. It will be recalled that he had shortly before carried out two delicate missions in the Middle East in an effort to ease tensions between the Arab states and Israel, which at one time last spring had threatened to erupt into war. Or the West might have invoked the good offices of some of the Asian and African nations, whose interests are at least as much affected by the Suez crisis as those of Britain and France—such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Ethiopia—in an effort to demonstrate that its policy toward Nasser is dictated not only by concern for the living standards of Western nations but by concern for the welfare also of the underdeveloped peoples east of Suez.

Instead, by insisting on a proposal for the establishment of an international authority which would control the canal and not merely advise about its use as proposed by India,

the West confronted Nasser with a course of action a nation which had just seen the end of British supervision could not be expected to accept. Then, when the Menzies committee returned from Cairo empty-handed, the West either encouraged, or did not act to prevent, the withdrawal of over 100 Western pilots on the assumption that this might bring traffic through the canal to a standstill, and that Nasser could then be charged with violation of the Constantinople Convention; and, as the threat of war arose again, suggested the formation of a "users' association" whose function would be to challenge Egypt's authority over the canal—a proposal which brought protests from Asian and African countries, even those which regard unhampered use of the canal as essential for their economic survival.

Benefits to Moscow

This series of moves, far from strengthening the West in its dealings with Egypt, promptly increased the influence of the U.S.S.R. The world witnessed the spectacle, which would have seemed incredible even a month before, of Russian pilots arriving to help the Egyptians maintain traffic through the canal. Moscow, which in the early summer had taken a dim view of the British Labor party following Mr. Khrush-

chev's wrangle with leading Laborites during his London visit, applauded Hugh Gaitskell's opposition to the Suez policy of Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden. And while the West thought it could force Egypt to the wall by economic measures such as the freezing of Egyptian sterling balances in London and Paris and the suspension of all forms of aid to Cairo, the net result may be that not only Egypt but other countries east of Suez will find it a matter of sheer economic necessity to rely increasingly on the Soviet bloc for trade and financing.

The possibility is not excluded that the Suez crisis will actually cut the West off from its traditional economic contacts with Asia and parts of Africa and consolidate the economic penetration of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, which up to that time had only been in its initial stages. Not only that, but it may prove that West Germany and Japan, both of which have been vigorously cultivating markets in the Middle East and Asia, will decline to be drawn into the West's controversy with Egypt, and find it to their advantage to remain on the sidelines of the economic war which could be the outcome of the Suez crisis. Should this happen, the network of military pacts the United States has been patiently building

along the periphery of the U.S.S.R. might be eroded—again without the firing of a shot.

To add to the West's complications, Nasser, who is by no means popular with some of the Arab rulers, notably King Hussein of Jordan and King Saud of Saudi Arabia, because of his appeal to the nationalist elements in their countries which might easily favor social revolution, is, by that very token, regarded by these elements as a symbol of Arab resistance to any form of Western "colonialism." In this respect Nasser performs a far more effective role of challenging the West than the U.S.S.R. itself could have done if it were in sole control of Egypt. And the West, by attacking Nasser and clearly indicating its determination to seek his downfall, has actually solidified his position in the Middle East, as indicated by the support Saudi Arabia and Syria now give Egypt. Thus far the West has failed to meet or turn back his challenge, which Russia, by giving him support that so far costs Moscow next to nothing, is able to utilize against the West in other parts of the world as well. A new phase, however, has been opened by referral of the Suez question to the UN Security Council on September 23.

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